

08. The Internet of Things and Qualitative Studies

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
THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO



**Security, Usability, & Privacy
Education & Research**

Transitioning to New Computing Paradigms

Mobile Authentication




Mobile Devices

- What are some other key security and privacy challenges for mobile devices?
 - Tracking for advertising
 - Tracking using MAC address
 - Tracking using accelerometer
 - Lack of desktop-based tools
 - Stealing telephone numbers by showing up at retail stores

Mobile Devices

- Stingrays (cell site simulator)



The Legal System

- Riley v. California (SCOTUS 2014)
 - Unanimous ruling that **warrantless** search of a phone during an arrest is unconstitutional
- U.S. v. Jones (SCOTUS 2012)
 - 4th Amendment requires a warrant for GPS tracking of a subject's car
- Can passwords be compelled? (5th Amendment)
 - This is being debated!

Self-Driving Cars

Self-Driving Cars



Internet of Things

What is the IoT?



What is the IoT?



amazon echo



What is the IoT?



Security Issues in Homes

- Sharing data
 - Many users
 - Many devices
 - Sensitive data
- Access to networks (e.g., wifi)
- Device pairing



Considerations in the Home

- Home as “castle”
- Occupants with social relationships
- Visitors; guests
- Surveillance
- Patching devices
- Side channels



Intruders vs. Intrusiveness

https://www.blaseur.com/papers/ubicomp14_talk_widescreen.pdf

Qualitative Coding

- Many different approaches
- Key goal: capture themes in data
- Often, but not always, develop codebook containing themes observed
- For robustness, another person follows the codebook and independently codes data
 - Agreement metrics include Cohen's Kappa

Safety-critical devices

Cars

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oqe6S6m73Zw>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3jstaBeXgAs>

Meta-issues with car privacy/security

- Why are our cars run by computers?
- Why are we connecting our cars to the Internet?
 - Rich media content
 - Real-time traffic and safety info
 - OTA updates
 - Self-driving cars
 - (Surveillance)
- Are privacy/security issues the same?

Meta-issues with privacy/security

- Let's answer the same questions for medical devices

Implantable Medical Devices (IMD)

- Embedded computers
- 350K Pacemakers & 173K Cardiac Defibrillators in 2006




Operational Requirements

- Possible goals
 - Collect information (diagnostics)
 - Provide information (medical history)
 - Perform medical function
- Disable IMD before conducting surgeries
- Access in emergency situations
- Constraints
 - Limited capacity of battery (replacement = surgery)

Risks in Medical Devices

- Vulnerabilities
 - Authentication
- Attack Vectors
 - Passive
 - Active
- Risks / threats
 - DoS
 - Changes in configuration
 - Replace medical records -- someone having a different operation
 - Injuries, death



Hacking Tests (1)

- **2008:** wireless access to a combination heart defibrillator and pacemaker (within two inches of the test gear)
- Disclose personal patient data
- Reprogram IMD to shut down and to deliver jolts of electricity that would potentially be fatal

Hacking Tests (2)

2011-2012-2013

- **Hacking Insulin Pumps**



-- insulinpump.com

2013 -- Black Hat /Defcon:

- **“Implantable medical devices: hacking humans”**
 - At 30 feet by compromising their pacemaker
 - Transmitter to scan for and interrogate individual medical implants
 - Security techniques for manufacturers

-- ioactive.com

Defense Approaches

- How do we achieve resistance to attacks?
 - What are the classes of attacks?
- What can go wrong?
- How do we balance utility and security/privacy?

Authentication Methods


- Passwords: how to make them available?
 - Tattooed passwords (visible, UV visible)
 - Bracelet
- Biometrics (face recognition)
- Smart Cards
- Touch-to-access policy
- Key-based systems
- Shields
 - Necklace
 - Computational wristband



-- Figures from Denning et al.

IMD Shield


- Proxy (messages exchanges)
- Authentication + encryption (channel)



- IMDShield -mit.edu

IMD Shield - Implementation

- Jammer design (full duplex radio)



- S. Gollakota et al. MIT

Wristbands / Alert Bracelets

- Safety in emergencies
- Security & Privacy under adversarial conditions
- Battery life

Wristbands / Alert Bracelets

- Protection is granted while wearing the bracelet.
- Remove to gain access to the IMD
- Inform patients about malicious actions – But not preventive
- Authentication + symmetric encryption
- Disadvantages
 - Relies on the patient wearing the bracelet
 - Reactive
 - Cognitive effects on patients



--Denning et al.

Usability Considerations

- Hospitals not having correct equipment
- Visual indicator of patients condition (something is wrong). Personal dignity.
- Carrying one more device
- Aesthetics
 - Wristbands (especially). “Mockups are unaesthetic”
 - Tattoos
- Mental and physical inconvenience
- Cultural and historical associations

Electronic Medical Records

- Why do we want *electronic* medical records?
- What are privacy/security concerns about electronic medical records?
- How do we mitigate those concerns?