

# 17. Retrospective Security and Privacy

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
THE UNIVERSITY OF  
CHICAGO



**Security, Usability, & Privacy**  
**Education & Research**

# Why should we care about retrospective security and privacy?

- Online social media sites (OSMs) are already around for a decade



- In sites like Twitter or Facebook
  - Users are content creators and managers
  - Might even need to change privacy preferences over time

# OSM Users change privacy preferences over time

2009



**Content posted in freshman year:**  
shared with everybody on internet

2012



**3 years later:** Hiring manager and colleagues **should not** see this

They need to manage their data retrospectively: control **who can see old content**

# What about cloud storage?

- At least one retrospective data management strategy is in the news for cloud storages

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**Dropbox: Oops, yeah, we didn't actually delete all your files – this bug kept them in the cloud**

**Biz apologizes after years-old data mysteriously reappears**

By Shaun Nichols, 24 Jan 2017

Security / #CyberSecurity

FEB 9, 2017 @ 04:00 AM 27,456

**Apple iCloud Hoards 'Deleted' Browser History Going Back More Than A Year**



**Thomas Fox-Brewster,**  
FORBES STAFF

igital and



Why can't I delete files from the cloud?

**Why can't I delete files from the cloud?**

This question has been **Answered**

I tried deleting some photos from the cloud, but got the following error message



★ **Why do my permanently deleted files keep reappearing?**

by I got 99 problems, but only one with Drive 4/30/15

**Deleted folders keep reappearing - Dropbox Community - 20277 ...**

<https://www.dropboxforum.com/t5/Installation/Deleted-folders-keep-reappearing/.../202...>

27 Jan 2015 - This last week, when I try to delete a folder it reappears a moment later. ... this machine is normally failing to delete the file, and following that ...



**3022416072** 19-Jun-2017 08:04

Member Since: 19-Jun-2017

I deleted the contact from the device but that does not delete it from the cloud.

# Challenges of retrospective data management

- Why might users want to manage access settings of their data retrospectively?
  - Social media
  - Cloud storage

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- Why might users want to manage access settings of their data retrospectively?
  - Social media
  - Cloud storage
- Life events, relationship change, relevance of content

# Challenges of retrospective data management

- How would they do the management?
- How can we improve the usability?



# Retrospective data management in social media

# Why do users do retrospective data management in social media?

- Study by Ayalon et al., 2013
  - Between subjects experiment
  - 272 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers
  - Four condition groups – content age 0-1 years, 1-2 years, 2+ years, 0-2+ years (control group)
  - Total randomly selected 1,304 Facebook posts
  - Measured “willingness to share with friends” with likert scale

# Why would users do retrospective data management in social media?

- Analyzed the data with linear mixed model (LME)
  - Willingness to share decrease with age of the post
  - If a post had lesser relevancy to the social connections then users are less willing to share
  - Younger users are less willing to share old posts
- Similar study by Blase (“post anachronism study”)
  - Willingness to share depends on life changes
  - With time for some posts users might want to share more and for others they want to share less

# Caveats of these studies?

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- Have not measured what users actually did over long time for all their posts
- Considered random posts
  - Might missed the important content
- Did the study over relatively small period of time
  - At most two years

# How about quantitative studies?

- Almuhammadi et al. did first study of deleted tweets in 2012
  - They listened to the tweets of 292,000 random users for one week
  - Total 67m tweets
  - Twitter also provided deletion notifications when the tweet was deleted
  - Total 2.4% of all tweets were deleted

# Difference between deleted and non-deleted tweets

- Almuhamdi et al. compared deleted and non-deleted tweets along multiple dimensions
  - Deleted tweets contain slightly more negative words than non-deleted ones
  - 17% of the tweets are deleted due to typos (how to detect?)
- Who are the users who deleted posts?

# Difference between users deleting and not-deleting tweets

- Bhattacharya et al. did a similar study on 2016
  - 194k users are monitored over one month
  - Total 17m tweets out of which 7% were deleted
  - Measured big five personality traits (how?)
  - Deleters are less conscientious and more neurotic in their dataset




# How about a study for a longer period of time?

How to collect data?

30/10/2015


(date of experiment)



**Time in past when the tweets were posted (relative to the date of experiment)**  
ranges from tweets posted **1 day back** to **6 years back**

- All of these past tweets were **public** when they were posted
- If **inaccessible** on experiment date, privacy preferences **changed** over time

# Do users employ retrospective mechanisms via deletion?



- Users change privacy for increasing amount of old data with time
- How do these users change privacy of this content?

# Retrospective mechanisms in Twitter

Three ways users change privacy of old content in Twitter


They are the longitudinal exposure control mechanisms

Mechanism	Description
<b>Selective deletion</b>	Selectively withdraw some old tweets to control exposure
<b>Account deletion</b>	Withdraw all old tweets to control exposure in bulk
<b>Making account private</b>	Withdraw all old tweets to control exposure in bulk

# Relative usage of these mechanisms

**Recent past:** primarily via **selective deletion**

**Far past:** primarily via **account deletion** and **making accounts private**



Very different mechanisms to change privacy for content from far past compared to recent past

# What fraction of users manage their old data?

- We randomly sample **100k** active users from 2009
- Out of 8.9m random old tweets from these users 29.1% is inaccessible
- What fraction of users change privacy of their content?

User type	% of all users
Selectively deleted tweets	8.3%
Deleted their account	15.9%
Made their account private	10.4%
<b>Users who take actions that changes privacy of their content</b>	<b>34.6%</b>

# Limitations of current deletion mechanisms

- Two limitations
  - Limitation 1: Retaining residual activities
  - Limitation 2: Creating signal to identify possibly sensitive content

# Limitation 1: Retained residual activities



These **conversations** from other users **remain public** even **after** a user **remove** her tweets/account

- These conversations are residual activities
  - Residual activities contain information about withdrawn old content
  - Anybody online can collect and analyze them by a username search

# Sensitive user interests revealed by residual activities

- We checked user interests revealed for deleted/private accounts from 2009

Deleted/private accounts	Topics of interest from hashtags	Hashtags revealed by residual activities
Account 1	Politics, Sports, Technology	#iranelection, #prisoners, #strike, #frenchopen, #tech
Account 2	Sports, LGBTQ issues	#davicup, #samesexsunday #india, #lgbt, #followfriday
Account 3	Sports	#grandrapids, #nascar



# Limitation 2: Creating signals to identify possibly sensitive content



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Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump  
It is so pathetic that the Dems have still not approved my full Cabinet.

Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump  
Reports that I will be working on the Apprentice during my presidency, even part time, are ridiculous and untrue - Fake news

Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump  
Stock market hits new high in longest winning streak since 1929 - even before the crash

Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump  
The Dems, and the media, are in for a long and painful defeat and the American people will be the winners.

**Deleted after 2 hours of posting**

## Donald Trump to Remain Executive Producer on 'Celebrity Apprentice' (EXCLUSIVE)

Cynthia Littleton  
Managing Editor: Television  
 79

2016-2017 OSCAR PREDICTION


# Dealing with the limitations is difficult

- Straw man:
  - Withdraw all the residual activities with original tweet/account
- Problem:
  - Residual activities are not “owned” by the original poster
  - Some OSMs solve it by age based withdrawal
  - Snapchat, Cyber dust
  - How does it solve the problem?
  - What additional problem can come up?


# Other retrospective data management mechanisms

- So far we talked mostly about deletions
  - What other mechanisms can be there?


# Other retrospective data management mechanisms




(a) Deleting individual post (no trace) in Facebook.




(d) Deleting content from the indirect exposure set in Facebook.



(b) Deleting individual post (with marker) in Skype.



(c) Deleting only owner's copy of content in Viber.




(e) Age-based deletion in Snapchat.




(f) Inactivity-based deletion in 4chan.


# Other retrospective data management mechanisms




(a) Edit post (no trace) in Tumblr.




(b) Edited post (with edit history) in Facebook.



(c) Edited post (with the small pencil icon as marker) in Skype.



(d) Editing only captions/tags in Instagram.



(e) Archive in Instagram.



(f) Anonymize in Reddit.

# Improving retrospective data management mechanisms

- What are the remaining challenges?

# Improving retrospective data management mechanisms

- What are the remaining challenges?
  - Building systems to help users
  - Concern with shared nature of social content
  - Usability evaluations
  - ...




# Retrospective data management in cloud storage

# User perceptions of deletion in cloud storage

- Ramonkapane et al.: how do users retrospectively manage their data in cloud storage?
  - Qualitative approach
  - Semi-structured interview of 26 participants
  - Analysis by iterative coding
  - Goal: understanding perception about deletion in cloud storage

# User perceptions of deletion in cloud storage

- Motivations to delete from cloud storage
    - Lack of trust on provider
    - Avoid future conflicts
    - To forget
  - Tidying up cloud storage
  - Organizational policy compliance
  - Perceived value
  - Self-efficacy
- 
- The diagram consists of five blue curly braces on the right side of the list, each grouping a set of motivations. The first brace groups 'Lack of trust on provider', 'Avoid future conflicts', and 'To forget'. The second brace groups 'Tidying up cloud storage'. The third brace groups 'Organizational policy compliance' and 'Perceived value'. The fourth brace groups 'Self-efficacy'. The labels 'Privacy', 'Storage', 'Policy', and 'Expertise' are placed to the right of their respective braces.
- Privacy
  - Storage
  - Policy
  - Expertise

# User perceptions of deletion in cloud storage

- Reasons for deletion failures in cloud storage
  - Insufficient information in ToS, deletion messages,
  - Wrong mental models, e.g., in a shared folder *only* the user's copy will be deleted (like whatsapp)
  - User interface issues (specially in mobile)

# How do users cope with deletion?

- Changing cloud providers
- Not even writing sensitive data to the cloud
- Deleting from one device because they can use the device better
- Seeking help from friends
- Deleting a different file to free up space
- Ad hoc strategies like buying more cloud storage
- Head in the sand – doing nothing

# How about cloud storage deletion in real-world ?

- Ramonkapane et al. dealt with user perception
  - They have not checked what users might actually do
  - Blase and others did a survey study
  - Goal: To understand whether users manage access to old content
  - 100 Amazon mechanical users with 10 files (by stratified sampling)
  - They asked for each piece of content whether the user want to keep the content or delete or encrypt the content
  - They asked other questions regarding the content itself

# How about cloud storage deletion in real-world ?

- They used a mixed effect logistic regression for data analysis
  - 48% of participants wanted to delete/encrypt half of more of all the files shown
  - Encrypt decisions were mainly driven by privacy
  - Decisions to delete a file was primarily driven by lack of future use
  - Similar file types should have similar management decision

# Improving cloud storage data management

- Users want to manage a huge amount of data
  - They end up not managing much
  - They need better tools to browse through their online archive
  - Is it possible to come up with some automated system to help?
  - One relevant example: Cloudsweeper