




Illustration: Matt Stevens

Rethinking Access Control In the Home IoT

CMSC 23210/33210 Usable Security and Privacy

Weijia He, Maximilian Golla, Roshni Padhi, Jordan Ofek, Markus Dürmuth,
Earlence Fernandes, Blase Ur




Back to the Future Part II - Universal Pictures - cnn.com



c|net

CNET Smart Apartment - cnet.com


From Single User to Multi User




Single User

iPhone X, macOS High Sierra - apple.com

From Single User to Multi User




Vendors Still Treat It The Old Way!



Please Enter Your Password:



Please Enter Your Password:



Home IoT Devices



“Play music!”

“Order me a puppy!”

Just to Summarize...

Traditional Devices	Home IoT
A Single User	Multiple Users
With Keyboard & Screen	Often Without Keyboard & Screen
Device-level Access Control	Capability-level Access Control

Research Goals



We conducted a user study to...

- Map desired access-control policies for home IoT devices
 - How policies vary by relationships and capabilities
 - Identify potential default policies

Method


Before Implementing the Survey...

- What do relationships and capabilities mean for home IoT?

6 Relationships



24 Relationships



6 Relationships

- Your Spouse
- Your Teenage Child
- Your Child in Elementary School
- A Visiting Family Member
- The Babysitter
- Your Neighbor

22 Capabilities

tom'sguide PRODUCT REVIEWS DEALS HOW TO FORUM IPHONE 8 AND IPHONE X

SMART HOME > BEST PICKS

Best Smart Home Gadgets of 2017

by MIKE PROSPERO Aug 3, 2017, 12:21 PM

[f](#) [t](#) [p](#) [d](#) [w](#) [r](#) [s](#) [e](#)



Best Smart Speaker
AMAZON ECHO

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Best Security Camera
NETGEAR ARLO Q


9/10 [REVIEW >](#) \$145 [Amazon](#)



Best Light Bulb
PHILIPS HUE WHITE AND STARTER KIT

8/10 [REVIEW >](#) \$69 [Amazon](#)

1)



22 Capabilities

tom's guide PRODUCT REVIEWS DEALS HOW TO FORUM IPHONE 8 AND IPHONE X

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
9/10 [REVIEW >](#) \$145 [Amazon](#)

Best Light Bulb
PHILIPS HUE WHITE A19 STARTER KIT



8/10 [REVIEW >](#) \$69 [Amazon](#)

1)



2)



Order Online




Live Video



3)



Mower Rule



Lights Rule

Answer Door

User Study

Imagine you are the owner of a **<smart device>**.

Using this device, some users can access the following feature:

<capability>.

6x

When should **<relationship>** be able to use this feature?

- Always
- Sometimes
- Never

User Study

Imagine you are the owner of a **Smart Voice Assistant**.

Using this device, some users can access the following feature:

Make online purchases (e. g., on Amazon) on a shared household account.


When should **your spouse** be able to use this feature?

- Always
- Sometimes
- Never

Are Relationships and Capabilities Enough?



5 pm – 6 pm



12 am – 1 am



Research Goals



We conducted a user study to...

- Map desired access-control policies for Home IoT Devices
 - How policies vary by relationships and capabilities
 - Identify potential default policies
- What contextual factors affect the user's decision?

User Study

Imagine you are the owner of a **Smart Voice Assistant**.

Using this device, some users can access the following feature:

Make online purchases (e. g., on Amazon) on a shared household account.

When should **your spouse** be able to use this feature?


- Always
- Sometimes
- Never

User Study

- When should they have access to this capability?
- When should they **not** have access to this capability?

Results

425 Participants



54% Male

46% Female


Age
25-34

47%

CS

19%


Home IoT Device





44%

Results




Given **one particular capability**, what **access-control policy** should be set up for **whom**?




Comparison Between Capabilities



Capabilities Within One Device




Spouse Can Do Almost Everything




Neighbor Can Do Nothing



Other Relationships Are More Complex




Teenager vs. Child



“At 16 they would be able to pick their own things to buy but the final purchase should be ultimately my choice and need my authorization.”


Teenager vs. Child



“At 16 they would be able to pick their own things to buy but the final purchase should be ultimately my choice and need my authorization.”

“They are in no way responsible enough at this age.”

Relationships Matter...But Are Not Enough



Relationships Matter...But Are Not Enough




Contextual Factors

Factor: Time of Day



“I would not want anyone trying to use the mower at night. The neighbors would most likely get mad.”

Factor: People Around



“They would be allowed to use it whenever I am home with them.”

Factor: Location of User



“Why do you need to use it if you aren’t close?”

Factor: Location of Device




“If it is used in the bedroom then it would matter who has access.”

Factor: Explicit Permission




“When they are authorized by the owner.”

Factor: Consequences




Factor: Responsible Usage




“They shouldn't use the lights if they are using them too frequently.”

Factor: Understanding



“I would need to teach her how to first.”

Factor: Help



“If they want to come over to mow the lawn, then why not?”

Recap: Missing From Current Systems


Relationships

Capabilities


Contextual Factors

Design Implications


Current: Guest vs. Owner




Future: Designing for Relationships




Future: Designing for Relationships




Future: Designing for Relationships





Future: Relationships and Capabilities




Future: Relationships and Capabilities




Current: Full Access or Temporary Access



Future: Contextual Factors



Future: Device Context




Smartphone Icon – pixabay.com

Indoor Camera – homesecurity.ml

Blink XT Add On Camera - blinkforhome.com

Future: Device Location



Smartphone Icon – pixabay.com
Living room – raidwarning.net
bedroom-21 - ffooty.com



Capability-Based
Access-Control Policies



Relationships Determine
Default Policies



Support Context-
Dependent Policies

Rethinking Access Control and Authentication for the Home Internet of Things

Weijia He, Maximilian Golla, Roshni Padhi,
Jordan Ofek, Markus Dürmuth, Earlene
Fernandes, Blase Ur



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RUB

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UNIVERSITY *of*
WASHINGTON

Fairness and Machine Learning

Galen Harrison

Julia Hanson

Usable Security and Privacy CMSC 23210/33210

- 1. Why does this matter?**
- 2. What is machine learning?**
- 3. Why should we be worried about whether or not it's fair?**
- 4. What are some techniques for making machine learning fair?**

Machine Bias

There's software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it's biased against blacks.

by Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner, ProPublica

May 23, 2016

Machine Bias

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Car Insurance Companies Charge Higher Rates in Some Minority Neighborhoods

First-of-its-kind data analysis finds price differences that can't be explained by risk alone

By Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Lauren Kirchner, and Surya Mattu of ProPublica
Last updated: April 21, 2017

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Amazon's Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress With Mugshots



By [Jacob Snow](#), Technology & Civil Liberties Attorney, ACLU of Northern California

JULY 26, 2018 | 8:00 AM

TAGS: [Face Recognition Technology](#), [Surveillance Technologies](#), [Privacy & Technology](#)



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Amazon scraps secret AI recruiting tool that showed bias against women

Jeffrey Dastin

8 MIN READ



By [Jacob Snow](#), Technology & Civil Liberties Attorney, ACLU of Northern California

JULY 26, 2018 | 8:00 AM

TAGS: [Face Recognition Technology](#), [Surveillance Technologies](#), [Privacy & Technology](#)




What is Machine Learning?

- Problem
 - There is some unknown function $f: A \rightarrow B$
 - Examples $A = \{\text{pictures}\}, B = \{\text{is face}\}$
 $A = \{\text{chess board}\}, B = \{\text{optimal move}\}$

What is Machine Learning?

- Can't find f directly, but have examples of $(\vec{a}, f(\vec{a}))$
- Can approximate f
- \vec{a} could be pixels of picture
 - in income prediction (age, education, ...)

Linear Regression



Regression

“Most machine learning is actually regression” - Someone

Key idea: find the right $\vec{w} = (w_1, w_2, \dots, w_k)$

Such that $\sum_{i=1}^n (w \cdot x_i - y_i)^2$

Other Machine Learning Techniques

- Logistic regression
- Support Vector Machines (SVM)
- Deep learning (aka neural networks)

Key Questions

- These will be more relevant later!
- Does the type of model applied to the problem matter? If so, when?
- When does the machine learning problem matter?
- What, if anything, makes the use of data for ML different from other ways of making decisions?

Returning to Compas

Machine Bias

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by Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner, ProPublica

May 23, 2016

Propublica reporting on Northpointe risk assessment tool

Risk Assessments

- Risk assessments = Predictive algorithms
- **In bail hearings:** “*will this person commit a crime or fail to appear in court?*”
- **At sentencing:** “*will this person commit crime in the future?*”
- **Theoretical goal:** reduce the number of individuals behind bars before trial without increasing risk to the public

Returning to Compass

137 questions, 10 topics

Current criminal charges

Criminal attitudes

Criminal history

Neighborhood safety

Substance abuse

Criminal history of friends and
family

Stability of employment

Quality of social life

Personality

Education and behavior in school

No questions about sensitive features!

Consider the following

$$PPV = \frac{TP}{TP + FP}$$

$$FPR = \frac{p}{1-p} \frac{1 - PPV}{PPV} (1 - FNR)$$

One Problem

- If p differs between two groups, then equal PPV implies differing FPR rates

$$FPR = \frac{p}{1-p} \frac{1-PPV}{PPV} (1-FNR)$$

Other ways bias can arise

- Pre-existing bias
 - Individual - individual people within system design, implementation, use are biased
 - Societal - society as a whole has biases (e.g. a loan system that uses zip codes, reinforcing redlining)

Other ways bias can arise

- Technical Bias
 - Computer tools
 - Decontextualized algorithms
 - Random number generation
 - Formalization of human constraints

Other ways bias can arise

- Emergent Bias
 - New Societal Knowledge
 - Mismatch between users and system
 - Different expertise
 - Different values

Another perspective

- (1) *Fair*: lacking biases which create unfair and discriminatory outcomes;
- (2) *Accountable*: answerable to the people subject to them;
- (3) *Transparent*: open about how, and why, particular decisions were made.

By assuring these conditions are met, we can rest easy, threatened no more by the possibility of an algorithm producing harmful outcomes.

Another perspective

- (1) *Fair*: lacking biases
(2) *Accountable*: answerable
(3) *Transparent*: open and accountable
- By assuring these conditions, the algorithm producing human mulches




Figure 1: A publicity image for the project, produced by Logan-Nolan Industries

Key Questions

- What is the specific problem that we're trying to solve?
- How much responsibility does the data scientist/machine learning developer have for the broader effects of their work?
- Should we be concerned with *fairness* per se? Or is justice/control/equity a better framing?

Possible solutions

- Technical
- Design
- Regulatory

Individual Fairness

Idea: treat similar people in a similar manner

$M : V \rightarrow \Delta(A)$, d_1, d_2 metrics in V and $\Delta(A)$ respectively

$$d_2(M(x), M(y)) \leq d_1(x, y)$$

What intuitions does this encode? What might be some problems?

Disparate Impact

- Equal Employment Opportunity Commission interprets to say that if a facially neutral test selects a group at 80% of the rate for other groups, then it is discriminatory according to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act § 2000e-2(a) (2)
- Generalize to
$$\frac{Pr(C = 1 | X = 0)}{Pr(C = 1 | X = 1)} \leq \tau$$

Process Fairness

- Idea: Some features may be fair to use, others may not be
- Base feature use fairness through a survey
- Examples
 - Current charges
 - Criminal History: self
 - Criminal History: social circle
 - Education and school behavior

**Human Perceptions of Fairness in
Algorithmic Decision Making: A Case
Study of Criminal Risk Prediction,
Grgić-Hlača et al. 2018**

Questions? Comments?

Additional Resources

- ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency (ACM FAT*) <https://fatconference.org/>
- FAT/ML <http://www.fatml.org/>
- Social Media Collective Critical Algorithm Studies Reading List <https://socialmediacollective.org/reading-lists/critical-algorithm-studies/>

